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DAIRY FARM MANAGEMENT WHEN NUTRIENT
RUNOFF AND CLIMATE EMISSIONS COUNT
SANNA LÖTJÖNEN, ESA TEMMES, AND MARKKU OLLIKAINEN
We provide a theoretical framework and detailed bioeconomic simulations to examine privately and
socially optimal dairy farmmanagement in the presence of nutrient runoff and greenhouse gas emissions.
Dairy farms produce milk by choosing herd size, diet, fertilization and land allocation between crops, as
well as (discrete) manure storage and spreading technologies and the number of milking seasons. We
show analytically that a critical radius emerges for the choice of land use between silage and cereal culti-
vation and fertilizer types (mineral and manure). Both privately and socially optimal manure application
rates decrease with application distance. We characterize the optimal climate and water policy instru-
ments for dairy farming. Adetailed bioeconomic simulationmodel links farmmanagement decisions with
their impacts on climate andwater quality.Wenumerically solve the social andprivate optimaand the fea-
tures of optimal climate and water policy instruments. We show that using only climate instruments pro-
vides considerable water co-benefits, and in the same vein, the use of water quality instruments provides
considerable climate co-benefits. Climate policies lead to a reduction in herd size, as measures relating to
manuremanagement and spreading are relatively inefficient at reducing climate emissions. There ismuch
more leeway for adapting to water policies than to climate policies, because dairy farms have multiple
measures to reduce their nutrient loads.
Keywords: Critical radius, dairymanagement, greenhouse gas emissions, nutrient runoff, optimal diet,
spatial pattern of manure application.
JEL codes: Q12, Q15, Q18, Q52.
Agricultural dairy production is currently
receiving much attention in terms of environ-
mental policy. Methane emissions from animal
husbandry and other greenhouse gases
increase global warming. Nutrient loads from
dairy production are considerable in many
regions, such as the Baltic Sea and the Chesa-
peake Bay. Designing effective environmental
policies requires a good understanding of the
specific nature of animal husbandry. Dairy pro-
duction differs in many important ways from
crop production. Instead of a land parcel, the
primary production unit is the production ani-
mal, and arable farmland mostly has a support-
ing role in dairy production, serving mainly as a
source of animal feed.Another key difference is
the production and use of manure. Manure is
concurrently a costly byproduct and a valuable
fertilizer source for crops. Costly manure trans-
portation impacts decisions concerning its use.
Livestock accounts for approximately 80%
of the non-carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
from agriculture, and the greatest share of this
stems from ruminants (Havlik et al. 2014).
Methane (CH4) emissions fromenteric fermen-
tation and manure management are the main
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sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
from dairy production (Gerber et al. 2013).
Manure storage and spreading cause nitrous
oxide (N2O) emissions. In addition, nitrogen
(N) is volatilized as ammonium (NH3) during
manure storage and spreading. Volatilized N
reduces the amount of N available for crops in
manure. Measures to reduce GHG emissions
in dairy production are relatively scarce. Diet
slightly impacts GHG emissions, as does the
spreading technology. By far, themost effective
short-term measure to reduce emissions is to
reduce the number of productive animals while
increasing the productivity of milking cows in
the long term. Feed production is also a signifi-
cant source of emissions (Gerber et al. 2013).
Animal husbandry produces nutrient loads
from many sources. Poorly designed and
managed manure storage systems may leak
or spill over. Manure spreading onto fields is
another source of nutrient runoff; the amount
of runoff depends on the amount of manure
used per hectare and the spreading technology
(in addition to exogenous properties of field
parcels). Diet choice impacts the amount and
nutrient content of manure and, thereby, not
only crop yields but also runoff. In addition
to improving manure storage facilities, the
dairy farmer can reduce nutrient runoff by
measures similar to those used in crop produc-
tion (such as reducing fertilization, using
buffer strips and catch crops, see Lichtenberg
2002; Shortle and Horan 2001; Lichtenberg
1989; Lankoski and Ollikainen 2003).
The objective of this paper is to examine the
climate policy toward dairy farming when soci-
ety considers nutrient loading to be a co-
benefit or an independent policy objective
and vice versa for nutrient policy. We provide
a formal analysis of the privately and socially
optimal dairy management in the presence of
either nutrient runoff or GHG emissions or
both. Farmers are assumed to target nitrogen
application in cereal and silage production,
because in most cases nitrogen is the limiting
factor for crop growth. Furthermore, nitrogen
provides a common source of bothGHG emis-
sions and nutrient runoff through the continu-
ous choices of diet, manure application and
land allocation, as well as discrete technology
choices. Focusing on both global and regional
pollutants, we compare the private spatial pat-
tern of the use of manure and mineral fertil-
izers to the social optimum. Drawing on this
comparison, we derive the first-best and
second-best policy instruments that shift the
private solution to the socially optimal one.
To facilitate comparison of results with previ-
ous theoretical work (Schnitkey and Miranda
1993; Innes 2000) focusing on steady-state use
of phosphorus instead of nitrogen, we also
examine how phosphorus policies relate to cli-
mate policies. Special focus on phosphorus also
helps to link our analysis to the recent discus-
sions on finding solutions to the excess manure
produced by livestock farms. Excess manure is
amain source of highphosphorus loads inmany
countries and notably in the US (Kaplan,
Johansson and Peters 2004; Huang, Magleby
and Christensen 2005). The root cause of the
phosphorus problem lies in the fact thatmanure
has an excessive phosphorus content relative to
nitrogen with regard to crop needs. Finding
crop fields outside of livestock farms for appli-
cation of excess manure is difficult, and devel-
oping other solutions, such as separation of
nutrients, has been challenging, especially for
manure from dairy farms (Innes 2000; Kaplan,
Johansson and Peters 2004; Huang, Magleby
and Christensen 2005; Iho, Parker and Zilber-
man 2012). Nevertheless, manure export has
been steadily increasing in the US and else-
where. For instance, in Nebraska, 36% of sur-
vey respondents exported livestock manure
(Glewen and Koelsch 2001), and in Tennessee,
37% of survey respondents exported poultry
litter (Jensen et al. 2010). Additionally, compa-
nies are starting to use more livestock manure
to generate energy (BHSL Hydro 2019).
In our model, the farm manager maximizes
revenues from milk production by choosing
herd size and diet, fertilization and land alloca-
tion between crops, the number of milking
seasons, and the technologies implemented
for manure storage and spreading. Diet choice
lies at the heart of the model. Changes in diet
impact milk production (per-animal profits),
methane emissions from enteric fermentation,
manure excretion and nutrient composition,
fertilizer application, and land allocation
between crops. We provide general results
characterizing the impacts of prices, costs,
and taxes on the optimal management of dairy
farms. This leads to general hypotheses con-
cerning the impacts of exogenous variables
on dairy farm management decisions and
thereby GHG emissions and nutrient loads.
To examine the hypotheses numerically and
provide further insights, especially for the dis-
crete technology choices, we develop a
detailed bioeconomic simulation model and
link all relevant climate and water quality
impacts of farm management decisions to the
model. We numerically solve the social and
Lötjönen, Temmes and Ollikainen Dairy Farm: Nutrient Runoff and Climate Emissions 961
private optima, and describe the features of
optimal climate and water policies.
Our work relates to previous literature as fol-
lows. Starting with climate emissions, there are
no theoretical treatments of the subject, but sev-
eral whole-farm models numerically calculate
dairy farm GHG emissions, for example Dairy-
Sim, FarmGHG, SIMSDAIRY, and FarmSim
(Schils et al. 2007). These models differ from
one another, for instance, in terms of precision
and system boundaries. Many of these models
also account for nutrient flows but are mainly
designed for simulating GHG emissions. Many
studies also consider climate change mitigation
measures, such as increasing productivity or
reducing animal numbers, through simulations
(Garnett 2009). Lengers and Britz (2012) use a
detailed biodynamic DAIRYDYN model to
analyze GHG emission abatement and con-
clude that policies targeting GHG emissions
should be based on indicators rather than on
actual emissions. Baerenklau, Nergis, and
Schwabe (2008) and Key and Kaplan (2007)
modeled ammonia emissions frommanure stor-
age and application, which is also done in our
model. Arndt et al. (2018) showed that altering
manure management practices, especially by
reducing solids in slurry, could mitigate cattle-
related CH4 emissions. Considering both nutri-
ent runoff and GHG emissions, Schils et al.
(2006, 2007) concluded that historically in the
Netherlands and in simulation models, more
efficient N management in dairy farming has
also led to reduced GHG emissions.
Turning to water quality issues, Kaplan,
Johansson, and Peters (2004); Yap et al.
(2004); Key and Kaplan (2007) and Baerenk-
lau, Nergis, and Schwabe (2008) provide
numerical simulations and examine either
farmers’ choices or impacts of selected manure
policies. The most commonly examined policy
instruments are restrictions on fertilization
intensity. Depending on the paper, farmers
adjusted to policies by changing fertilization
and herd size, and bymaking (discrete) techno-
logical decisions concerning manure storage
and application. Yap et al. (2004); Helin
(2014); and Bosch, Wolfe, and Knowlton
(2006) allowed the farmer to also adjust the diet
of the animals and suggested that diet alteration
is an important means of adjusting to policies.
With two notable exceptions (Schnitkey and
Miranda1993;Innes2000),theoreticaltreatments
of dairy farm management in the presence of
nutrient loading are absent, and so are studies on
socially optimal production choices. Schnitkey
and Miranda (1993) show the existence of a
critical radius that defines an outer limit for
manure application in the steady state. Mineral
fertilizers are applied beyond this radius because
they are not sensitive to transportation distance.
They also show that phosphorus intensity is
higher in all fields where manure is used relative
to that of mineral fertilizers. Innes (2000) uses a
more general and regional model and confirms
Schnitkey and Miranda’s result on the critical
radius and finds that a private optimumproduces
toomanyanimalsintoomanyfacilities.Ourpaper
examines analytically whether these features
show up when the focus is on nitrogen instead of
phosphorus under the hypothesis that a similar
pattern emerges for nitrogen application.
Our paper contributes to the literature in
many ways. First, unlike previous literature,
we provide a comprehensive theoreticalmodel
of dairy farming and for the first time in the lit-
erature derive how exogenous variables and
policy instruments impact private dairy man-
agement and thereby both climate and water
quality impacts. Second, we analytically
develop key features of optimal climate and
water policies that address the spatial aspects
of fertilizer and crop choice. Third, we focus
on the coherence between water and climate
policies by asking how water policy instru-
ments promote climate targets and vice versa.
The rest of our paper is organized as fol-
lows. We develop a theoretical framework
and provide a formal analysis of privately
and socially optimal dairy production. Then,
we present the simulation model. The next
section gathers results from numerical simula-
tions and presents sensitivity and policy ana-
lyses. The last section provides conclusions.
Dairy Farm Model
This section describes the dairy farm model.
We first develop an analytical model focusing
on both socially and privately optimal choices
and government policy instruments. We then
present the detailed implementation of the
numerical simulation model.
Basic Model Set-up
Consider a dairy farm with H lactating cows.
Their diet consists of two components: concen-
trate feeds and silage. The farmer decides on
the quantity of the concentrate feed, and the
animals have free access to silage. The quantity
of concentrate feed, denoted by v, impacts the
voluntary silage intake so that the total intake
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becomes a function of concentrate feeding γ(v)
(γv > 0). The composition and total quantity of
consumed feedstuff affects the milk yield,
manure excretion, and manure nutrient con-
tent. As total intake and feed composition are
fully determined by the quantity of the concen-
trate feed used, we denote the milk production
function by g(v) (gv > 0), the manure produc-
tion function by w(v) (wv > 0), the manure N
content by θN(v), and the manure P content
by θP(v) (θPv > 0 and θ
N
v < 0, with the feeds used
in the simulations).We assume a fixed share of
calves and heifers per dairy cow, which is
determined endogenously by the optimal
number of milking seasons (i.e. lactations).
We assume that the farmer produces all
silage on farm, as silage markets are typically
local and unreliable due to high transportation
costs. Silage therefore has no conventional
input price; rather, its profitability is defined
by production and opportunity costs. Concen-
trates, in contrast, have a market price of pv,
and the produced milk is sold at a price of pM.
Animal upkeep costs and profits from
exported animals are assumed to be constant
per milking cow and are denoted by φ. Func-
tion i(H) describes the annual capital costs of
investments given herd size, for example, pro-
duction facilities, machinery, and animal shel-
ters. Thus, we express the total direct net
profit from milk production as
ð1Þ π1 = pMg vð Þ−vpv−φ
 
H− i Hð Þ
The farmer manages a given size of farm-
land, denoted byA.We assume that the spatial
distribution of the land follows a continuous
density function,q(r), where r marks the dis-
tance from the center of the farm. If R repre-
sents the distance to the furthest point of the
farm, then land distribution can be
expressed as
ð2Þ A=
ðR
0
q rð Þdr
All facilities are located at the farm center
by assumption. At every point on the farm-
land, the farmer chooses whether to produce
silage or cereals and then chooses the appro-
priate amounts for manure and mineral fertil-
izer applications. We assume that the land is
homogenous with respect to all other proper-
ties except distance. Because silage has rela-
tively high transportation costs per unit
compared to cereals, silage production will be
allocated in areas close to the farm center. Fur-
thermore, given that manure has significantly
higher transportation costs than mineral fertil-
izers, manure is applied to parcels close to the
production facilities. As the relative profitabil-
ity of both silage production and manure
application decreases monotonically with dis-
tance, unique distances exist, marking the
outer limits for silage production and manure
application, which need not coincide. We
denote the critical radius for manure applica-
tion by rm and that for silage production by rs.
Nitrogen is assumed to limit crop growth.
Thus, we employ response functions with N
as the only decision variable. fs(N) denotes
the yield response function for silage, and
fc(N) denotes the same for cereals. The total
N fertilization at a given point (distance) is
defined by the amount of applied manure
and mineral fertilizer (m(r) and l(r), respec-
tively), and their N content (θN(v) and εN,
respectively). Mineral fertilizer has a market
price of pl(r), and due to its compact nature,
its application cost is minor. Manure, in con-
trast, is a free byproduct of milk production
and has high transportation and application
costs, denoted by a(r), which can be given dif-
ferent values depending on the discrete choice
of spreading technology. We assume that this
function increases linearly with r. The farm
has the possibility of exporting excess manure
at increasing costs to nearby areas, and we
denote this transport cost with C(r).
A processing cost term is introduced for
both crops, including costs from harvesting,
storage, and other associated expenses. For
silage, hauling causes a significant share of
the processing costs, making the costs depen-
dent on the distance to the parcel in question.
Distance-related costs for cereals are consid-
ered insignificantly small. Thus, the per-unit
silage processing costs are a function of dis-
tance, hs(r), and the corresponding cost term
for cereals is constant, hc. Produced silage
has no off-farm market value and cannot be
exported, whereas cereals are exported at a
unit price of pc.
We combine the above components and
express the profits from farmland cultivation
as a sum of silage and cereal production sub-
tracted by the manure export cost:
A comparison of equations (1) and (3)
shows that the farmer does not make separate
decisions on milk production and cultivation
because the two production lines are linked
together.
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Dairy production causes environmental
impacts for which society accounts. Here, we
focus on damages from GHG emissions and N
and P runoff. Nutrient runoff depends on the
applied amounts of nutrients, the manure
spreading technology, and the cultivated crop.
In the numerical simulations, we focus on injec-
tion and broadcast spreading. Additionally, we
assume that the propensity for runoff is identi-
cal for both fertilizer inputs. Pointwise nutrient
loads from silage and cereal cultivation, xs and
xc, respectively, are separated as the propensity
to runoff differs between the two crops.Reflect-
ing the ratio inwhich algae use nutrients in their
growth, we express N and P runoff as nitrogen
equivalents, N^, where P is transformed into N^
using the Redfield-ratio ς (Kiirikki et al.
2003). Thus, runoff as a function of fertiliza-
tion can be given by
Ð rs
0 x
s N^ rð Þ
 
q rð Þdr andÐR
rs x
c N^ rð Þ
 
q rð Þdr for silage and cereals,
respectively, where N^ m rð Þ, l rð Þ,vð Þ=N + ςP=
θN vð Þm rð Þ+ εNl rð Þ+ ς θP vð Þm rð Þ+ εPl rð Þ ,
that is, the amount of N in manure and in min-
eral fertilizers and the amount of P trans-
formed into N^ in manure and mineral
fertilizers.
The pointwise nutrient load damages from
cultivating silage and cereals are presented in
equation (4), where dw denotes the (constant)
marginal water damage:
ð4Þ dw
ðrs
0
xs N^ rð Þ
 
q rð Þdr +
ðR
rs
xc N^ rð Þ
 
q rð Þdr
 	
The description of damages is simple in equa-
tion (4), as we focus on a single dairy farm.
Nutrient runoff damages include both nitrogen
and phosphorus as nitrogen equivalents, and
both nutrients are assumed to cause eutrophica-
tion. This is the case in semiclosed sea areaswith
brackish waters, for example, in the Chesa-
peake Bay, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea.
Shifting the analysis to a landscape level would
require accounting for the transfer of nutrients
toward waterways and the impacts of aggregate
loads on water quality. Focusing on the land-
scape level would modify, but not fundamen-
tally change, the results of the farm-level
analysis.
Cattle are the main source of GHG emis-
sions from dairy farming because they emit
CH4. Methane emissions are created by
enteric fermentation and are diet dependent.
Thus, expressed as CO2-equivalents (CO2-
eq.), the emissions per cow can be given as
ec(v) (ecv > 0). Manure storages are a source of
N2O and CH4 emissions. CO2-eq. emissions
from storages (open or covered) per cow can
be defined as est(v) = ρw(v) where ρ is a coeffi-
cient, and we postulate that estv < 0. The sign is
negative due to reductions in manure N con-
tent and volatile solids excretion, which domi-
nate the effect of increased manure excretion.
The cultivation process itself is a source of
GHG emissions. Conventional broadcast
spreading technologies cause ammonia
(NH3) emissions and indirect emissions of
N2O, which is a strong GHG. An injection
technology is an alternative that effectively
eliminates NH3 emissions but causes direct
N2O emissions. The CO2-eq. emissions from
manure spreading are given as esp(r) = σm(r),
where m refers to one cubic meter of manure
spread on land at distance r, and σ is a coeffi-
cient (depending on the spreading technol-
ogy). Finally, autonomous GHG emissions
from soil and emissions from machinery per
hectare are denoted by ss and sc for silage
π2 =
ðrs
0
−hs rð Þf s εNl rð Þ+ θN vð Þm rð Þ −pl rð Þl rð Þ−a rð Þm rð Þ q rð Þdr
+
ðR
rs
pc−hc½ f c εNl rð Þ+ θN vð Þm rð Þ −pl rð Þl rð Þ−a rð Þm rð Þ 
q rð Þdr−C rð Þ w vð ÞH−
ðR
0
m rð Þq rð Þdr
2
4
3
5:
ð3Þ
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and cereal, respectively, and emissions from the
manufacturing of mineral fertilizers by δl(r).
We denote GHG emissions from silage and
cereal cultivation by
Ð rs
0 g
s m rð Þ, l rð Þð Þð Þq rð Þdr
and by
ÐR
rs g
c m rð Þ, l rð Þð Þð Þq rð Þdr, respectively,
where gs and gc refer to pointwise GHG emis-
sions, (σm(r) + δl(r) + ss) and (σm(r) + δl(r)
+ sc). Denoting the constant marginal climate
damage by dc gives total climate damage as
follows:
dc
h
E vð ÞH +
ðrs
0
gs m rð Þ,l rð Þð Þq rð Þdr
+
ðR
rs
gc m rð Þ,l rð Þð Þq rð Þdr
ið5Þ
where E(v) = ec(v) + est(v) is the climate emis-
sions from cattle and manure storage.1
Society maximizes social welfare from dairy
production (6) subject to two constraints: silage
used in the diet and manure application cannot
exceed the amounts actually produced (7):
We express the Lagrangian function of the
constrained maximization problem in a way
that facilitates a simple and clear presentation
of the economic choices and describe the deri-
vation of the Lagrangian function and the
explicit equations characterizing the optimum
in the online supplementary appendix 2
LW v,H,rs, l rð Þ,m rð Þ,λ1,λ2ð Þ
= ΩH−dcEH− i Hð Þ½ + Πs−Ds +Πc−Dc½ 
ð8Þ
Equation (8) decomposes the dairy farm
management decisions to those relating to the
net revenue from milk production (Ω) and
silage and cereal cultivation (Πs and Πc, respec-
tively) under the two constraints and environ-
mental impacts (dc denoting the damage from
GHG emissions from animals [E], and Ds and
Dc denoting joint climate and water externali-
ties from silage and cereal cultivation-related
processes, respectively). The model framework
is illustrated in figure A1 in the online supple-
mentary appendix 1.
Analytics
We use equation (8) to express socially opti-
mal dairy management in a simple and intui-
tive way. Setting environmental damage
max
v,H,rs,m rð Þ, l rð Þ
ΠW = pMg vð Þ−vpv−φ−dcE vð Þ H− i Hð Þ−C rð Þ w vð ÞH−
ðR
0
m rð Þq rð Þdr
2
4
3
5
+
ðrs
0
−hs rð Þf s εNl rð Þ+ θN vð Þm rð Þ −pl rð Þl rð Þ−a rð Þm rð Þ−dwxs m rð Þ,l rð Þ,vð Þ−dcgs m rð Þ,l rð Þð Þ q rð Þdr
+
ðR
rs
pc−hc½ f c εNl rð Þ+ θN vð Þm rð Þ −pl rð Þl rð Þ−a rð Þm rð Þ−dwxc m rð Þ,l rð Þ,vð Þ−dcgc m rð Þ,l rð Þð Þ q rð Þdr
ð6Þ
s:t:
ðrs
0
f s εNl rð Þ+ θN vð Þm rð Þ  q rð Þdr− γ vð Þ−v½ H ≥ 0
w vð ÞH−
ðR
0
m rð Þq rð Þdr ≥ 0:
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð7Þ
1 In summary, the negative environmental impacts considered
in the model include (1) GHGs from cow enteric fermentation
(CH4), e
c(v), and from manure storage (N2O, CH4), e
st(v) = ρw
(v) (giving E(v) = ec(v) + est(v) as the cow-specific emissions),
(2) GHGs from manure spreading (N2O, NH3), e
sp(r) = σm(r),
from silage and cereals (soil and machinery; CO2, N2O, CH4), s
s
and sc, respectively, and from mineral fertilizer manufacture
(CO2), δl(r) (giving g
s = σm(r) + δl(r) + ss and gc = σm(r) + δl(r)
+ sc), and (3) nutrient runoff from silage and cereal production
(N, P), xs N^ rð Þ
 
and xc N^ rð Þ
 
, respectively.
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functions equal to zero produces the privately
optimal choice. The exact formulas are com-
piled and reported in the online supplemen-
tary appendix 2. The formulas indicate that
via the choice of diet and the constraints, all
decision variables impact all parts of the
Lagrangian function (equations A1–A9). The
decision variables of the model are herd size
H, concentrate feed intake v, manure m(r)
and mineral fertilizer application l(r) at dis-
tance r, and the critical radius for silage culti-
vation rs.
Optimal herd size. The social and private herd
size decisions are determined at the point
where themarginal revenue from the last head
added to the herd equals its marginal costs, as
equations (9a) for the society and (9b) for the
private farmer suggest:
ð9aÞ Ω−dcE− i0 Hð Þ= 0,
ð9bÞ Ω− i0 Hð Þ= 0:
Society accounts for the climate impacts
from enteric fermentation and manure; thus,
the socially optimal herd size is smaller than
the private herd size. As equations (A3a)
and (A6) reveal, land allocation and fertili-
zation decisions affect the direct net revenue
per cow. Depending on the attractiveness of
manure as a fertilizer input, land allocation
and fertilization decision may either
increase or decrease the herd size in both
optima.
Optimal diet. The optimal diet is determined
by the choice of concentrate feed and the
properties of intake function, which then
determines the required silage use. The opti-
mality conditions are as follows:
ð10aÞ Ωv−dcEvð ÞH +Πsv−Dsv +Πcv−Dcv = 0
and
ð10bÞ ΩvH +Πsv +Πcv = 0
The derivatives show that concentrate feed-
ing impacts at the margin not only the value of
concentrate productivity in milk production
and associated feeding costs but also generates
positive stock effects for both silage and
manure, thereby increasing marginally profits
from silage and cereals. This creates an incen-
tive to increase concentrate feeding beyond
the level supported by milk production alone,
as the private optimality condition (10b) sug-
gests. This impact is, however, reduced at the
social optimum, which accounts for climate
and water externalities caused by higher
amounts of concentrate feeding.
Optimal land allocation. Arable land must be
allocated between cereals and silage. Despite
having no market value, the shadow price of
silage reflects the internal value of produced
silage and is, therefore, a key component in
the profit comparisons. Producing silage
removes farmland from cereal production.
The optimal land allocation requires the com-
parison of profits and damages from each crop
at each location while accounting for the
requirement of silage production. As silage
harvesting costs increase with distance, but
cereal harvesting costs are constant, the com-
petitiveness of silage production against
cereals declines monotonically with distance.
The critical radius rs indicates the distance
after which producing cereals becomes more
profitable and is defined as follows:
ð11aÞ Πs rsð Þ−Ds rsð Þ+Πc rsð Þ−Dc rsð Þ= 0
and
ð11bÞ Πs rsð Þ−Πc rsð Þ= 0
Land allocation at the social optimum
depends on how prone silage and cereals are
to both climate and water damage, and how
intensively these crops are fertilized. Silage
typically causes significantly smaller leaching
and soil GHG emissions than cereals, thus
increasing its attractiveness in cultivation.
The critical radius in the private optimum
neglects environmental externalities, leading
to a higher land area allocated to cereal culti-
vation. Note that the crops do not have identi-
cal fertilization rates; equations (11a)-(11b)
are based on the optimal fertilization of both
crops.
Optimal fertilization: Manure and mineral
fertilizer. The optimal fertilizer application
can be solved pointwise: for both fertilizer
types and each location, the optimal fertilizer
rate is determined by the equality of the value
of the marginal product to the marginal social
costs of the fertilizer comprising the input costs
and the sum of the marginal water and climate
damages. While mineral fertilizer has a con-
stant unit cost (price), with the cost of applica-
tion slightly increasing with distance, manure
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has an increasing transport cost over locations.
The critical radius for manure application rm
defines the distance where it is optimal to
switch frommanure to mineral fertilizer appli-
cation. The determination of rm requires some
calculation (see online supplementary appen-
dix 2), but the switching point can be
expressed in a rather simple form:
ð12aÞ a−C +D
i m,rmð Þ
θN
=
pl +Di l,rmð Þ
εN
and
ð12bÞ a−C
θN
=
pl
εN
where a denotes manure transportation and
application costs,C denotes the manure export
cost, pl represents the mineral fertilizer price,
θN and εN represent the manure and mineral
fertilizer N contents, respectively, and Di, with
i = s, c, denotes the joint climate and water
externalities from silage and cereal cultivation,
respectively. The private solution equals the
costs of manure and mineral fertilizer at loca-
tion r and is independent of crop choice
between silage and cereals (12b). The social
solution depends on the crop type due to the
different environmental damages associated
with silage and cereals (12a), which increase
the total social costs of applying both manure
and mineral fertilizers. As the social solution
is not independent of crop choice, two radii
appear. In practice, two radii can coexist only
if the radius is greater for cereals than for silage.
In this case, manure application will continue
after the change of crops, despite the farmer
having switched to mineral fertilization within
silage parcels. In the numerical simulations,
we find that for both cases, the radius is so long
that one radius actually turns out to be empiri-
cally relevant. Given that both fertilizer forms
are perfect substitutes in crop production, fer-
tilizers are not used jointly; the cheapest type
is always chosen. Therefore, close to the farm
center, manure will be applied exclusively until
mineral fertilizer becomes less costly at a cer-
tain distance. Beyond this range, only mineral
fertilizer is applied, and at the critical radius,
the optimal N application rate is equal for both
fertilizers. Thus, we conclude that relative to
mineral fertilizer application, the N application
rate is always higher on parcels under manure
fertilization, except at the point of indifference.
As a result, under an identical damage function,
the closest parcels contribute to more severe
runoff damage than the furthest fields.
Our first key theoretical results on the differ-
ences between private and social choices can be
summarized as follows. The private producer
has too many animals, uses too much concen-
trate feed and too much fertilizer, and allocates
too much land for cereal production compared
to the social optimum, leading to nutrient loads
and GHG emissions that are too high. From a
theoretical perspective, themost striking differ-
ence relates to fertilization, as unlike the social
optimum, the private critical radius for manure
application is independent of crop choice. This
shows that none of the variables are crop spe-
cific (see equations [12b] and [A9d]) because
a private farmer ignores environmental loads.
Intensified fertilization increases the manure
scarcity and its shadow price, and shortens the
critical radius ofmanure application. Neverthe-
less, given the increasing manure hauling cost
at location r, the spatial pattern of a monotoni-
cally decliningmanure application rate is found
both in the private and in the social optimum.
This result is new in the literature. Both Innes
(2000) and Schnitkey and Miranda (1993)
focused on the difference between manure
and mineral fertilizer intensities, assuming
implicitly that it would be socially preferable
to fertilize evenly on all parcels.
Finally, equations (1)–(12a and 12b) charac-
terize the continuous choices of dairy farming
subject to any discrete choice of technologies
and the number of milking seasons. Techno-
logical choices include manure storage with
or without a cover and manure spreading via
broadcast or injection. The combination that
provides the highest private profits or social
welfare is chosen.
Both socially and privately optimal choices
are characterized as a simultaneous solution
of herd size, diet, fertilization, and land alloca-
tion, all depending on exogenous variables.
The comparative statics of the private solution
are presented in table 1 (see details of the
derivation in the online supplementary mate-
rial 1). In deriving the comparative statics, we
assume a constant manure N content, an inte-
rior solution for manure application (the latter
constraint in equation (7) is ignored) and that
silage is fertilized solely with manure and
cereals solely with mineral fertilizer. As the
parameters are solved endogenously and
simultaneously, parameters other than the
one in focus have a strong impact on the
results. Next, we provide a short interpretation
of the results.
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The economic interpretation of the compara-
tive statics results concerning herd size and the
use of concentrate feed is straightforward: when
profitability of milk production increases due to
change in any exogenous variable (milk or con-
centrate feed price or constant cost per dairy
cow), both the herd size and use of concentrate
feed increase. What then happens to manure
application and land allocation between silage
and cereals is more complicated and depends
on two opposing effects. The higher herd size
tends to increase the land area allocated to
silage, but this is counter affected by the higher
use of concentrate feed tending to decrease the
need for silage. Here, changes in herd size dom-
inate, and the silage area increases with herd
size. Similar interpretation can be provided for
manure application: both higher herd size and
concentrate feed use increase the amount of
manure tending to increase per hectare fertiliza-
tion, whereas increased silage area tends to
decrease the amount of manure applied per
hectare. The overall effect is an increase in
per-hectare manure application.
In addition, prices determining revenue
from crop production indirectly impact milk
production. A higher crop (fertilizer) price
decreases (increases) herd size and increases
(decreases) the use of concentrate feed and
manure application. Mineral fertilizer inten-
sity is independent of variables directly
impacting milk production (due to the simpli-
fying assumption) and depends positively on
crop prices and negatively on fertilizer prices.
The role of the manure hauling cost is inter-
esting. An increase in application costs
decreases herd size to reduce the amount of
manure produced but increases concentrate
feed use, which enhances manure excretion.
The impact on per hectare manure use and
land allocation is negative, as lowered herd
size tends to decrease silage area and
increased manure application cost tends to
decrease manure application. In contrast,
higher costs of manure export tend to increase
manure application on a farm’s own fields to
reduce the need for exporting and to allocate
more land to silage. A subsidy on manure
export would reduce manure applications on
a farm’s own fields. A similar effect can be
achieved with administrative policy instru-
ments; for example, the US Nutrient Manage-
ment Plan regulates the spreading of manure
on livestock farms’ own fields, but if the
manure is exported to a crop farm, these regu-
lations no longer apply (Iho, Parker, and Zil-
berman 2012). Based on equation (A9d), an
increase in the mineral fertilizer price or
manure export cost lengthens the critical
radius for manure application, whereas an
increase in the manure hauling cost shortens
the critical radius (dr
m
dpl > 0,
drm
da < 0 and
drm
dc > 0).
From society’s perspective, the private opti-
mum entails excessive GHG emissions and
nutrient runoff. The policy challenge is to
reduce two different types of externalities:
global climate emissions and regional water
quality damages. The first-best policy design
is to levy instruments targeting both GHG
emissions and nutrient runoff. Alternatively,
given that GHG emissions and runoff are pro-
duced somewhat jointly, society may design a
second-best policy targeting eitherGHGemis-
sions only or nutrient runoff only.We examine
both alternatives here. We consider a Pigou-
vian policy consisting of an optimal carbon
tax on GHG emissions (τG) and a (second-
best) nutrient tax on fertilization (τN^s ,τ
N^
c )
(instead of a loading tax, as cultivation causes
nonpoint source pollution).
Taxes are derived by introducing them to
the private profit maximization problem and
solving for tax rates that make the socially
and privately optimal solutions identical
(including technology choice). Solving the
taxes yields the following:
ð13aÞ τG = dc,8r
m : τN^j rð Þ= dwxjN^ N^ m
* rð Þ,v*  
θN v*
 
+ ςθP v*
  ð13bÞ
and
l : τN^j = d
wxj
N^
ðN^ l* rð Þ 
εN + ςεP
 
, with j = s,c:
ð13cÞ
Table 1. Results of the Comparative Statics
for the Private Optimum
H v l(r) m(r) rs
pM + + 0 +* +*
pv − − 0 -* -*
φ − − 0 − −
a(r) − + 0 -* -*
C(r) -* -* 0 +* +*
pc − + + + −
pl(r) + − − − +
*The sign is determined under the parameter values used in private
optimization; otherwise, the sign is ambiguous.
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Drawing on equations (13a) – (13c), the sec-
ond set of our theoretical results is as follows.
The optimal carbon tax (13a) is uniform and
equal to the marginal climate damage reflect-
ing society’s valuation and levied on all
sources of GHG emissions. In contrast, the
nitrogen tax is a second-best tax reflecting
themarginal propensity of nitrogen equivalent
fertilization to estimated runoff valued by the
marginal water quality damage (Shortle and
Dunn 1986).
The tax on manure (13b) is differentiated in
each location because, due to transport cost,
fertilization by manure differs between all
locations (Lankoski and Ollikainen 2003;
Ervola, Lankoski and Ollikainen 2012; Lötjö-
nen and Ollikainen 2017), and the tax on min-
eral fertilizer (13c) is also slightly
differentiated. This spatial difference in
manure and mineral fertilizer application and
crops suggests that policies targeting loading
from crop production farms and dairy farms,
respectively, should also be differentiated.
Should society address GHG emissions only
and levy the climate tax on all emissions, equa-
tion (13a) would still hold, but addressing
nutrient loading only would result in a higher
tax rate for the nutrient tax due to the missing
impact of climate tax on fertilization intensity.
We acknowledge that using differentiated
instruments would entail transaction costs
when implemented. Therefore, it is interesting
to focus on some uniform taxes instead. One
possibility is to use a uniform tax on nutrients
and set a separate instrument on CH4 emis-
sions from animals. Drawing on the compara-
tive statics results, we can postulate that the
former works like an increase in the price of
mineral fertilizer or like an upward shift in
manure spreading costs. For the latter,
animal-based tax impacts like an increase in
the net costs per cow. We examine the size of
the impacts and the potential welfare loss in
numerical simulations.
Model Implementation
To further illustrate the properties and exam-
ine the overall impacts of the model, we next
present a numerical application. The data are
tailored to Finnish agriculture, but with case-
specific data, the model could also be applied
to other countries. The simulation model used
closely follows the analytical model, except
that the continuous spatial distribution of
farmland of the theory is replaced with
discretely distributed parcels of a given acre-
age in the simulations (60 ha in total in 6-ha
field parcels at 0.5 km intervals), and we add
pasture land (see details below). Although
the total field area is around the average value
in Finland (Niskanen and Lehtonen 2014), the
distances of field parcels from the farm center
are chosen to illustrate the effect of distance.
The calculations are performed with Mathe-
matica 11.2. For details on the data used, see
the online supplementary appendix 3.
The total intake function for dairy cows is
from Huhtanen et al. (2008). Functions for
manure excretion and nutrient content are
derived using data from Nennich et al.
(2005), with typical feed nutrient values, and
scaled to match Finnish estimates. For a con-
centrate feed intake of 15.9–16.1 kg/day, the
manure nitrogen content rounds up to
1.7 kg N/m3, and the phosphorus content
rounds up to 0.60 kg P/m3. Themilk yield func-
tion is based on Lehtonen (2017). Dairy cows
are assumed to have three to six milking sea-
sons (i.e. lactations) before they are slaugh-
tered. This number determines the required
number of calves and heifers for replacement
to keep animal numbers constant. Additional
milking seasons would reduce the required
number of young animals and thereby also
GHG emissions, but as a downside, milk yield
is reduced after three milking seasons. Dry
cows are not accounted for separately. The
milking season of dairy cows is 300 days/year,
and otherwise functions for intake andmanure
excretion are the same for the entire year.
Intake and manure excretion (Finlex 2014) of
heifers and calves are assumed to be constant.
Manure is stored as a slurry. Part of the nitro-
gen in the slurry is lost as volatilizedNH3 during
manure storage and after manure application.
Manure storage is either covered (floating
cover, 4% of N is lost during storage) or uncov-
ered (10%of theN is volatilized).After applica-
tion to fields, 9% to 40% of the slurry nitrogen
content is lost via volatilization depending on
the spreading technology (injection or broad-
cast, respectively). Data on nitrogen volatiliza-
tion are from Grönroos (2014). Quadratic
nitrogen yield responses used for barley and
silage are based on Lehtonen (2017).
A quadratic cost function is used to describe
the annual per-cow capital cost of investments
in dairy farming and is calibrated to limit the
optimal number of animals to approximately
60 dairy cows (one milking robot). We allow
the per dairy cow net profit term φ to include
the profit from exported animals and the
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upkeep costs from calves and heifers. Manure
excretion of heifers and calves is added to the
total quantity of manure produced. Note that
no fixed costs are included in the model. The
distance-related costs of silage processing and
manure application are estimated using Finn-
ish data on contractor fees (Palva 2015). The
unit cost of manure export is assumed to equal
the hauling cost for the distance of 1 km fur-
ther than the furthest parcel of the modeled
dairy farm, that is, we assume the recipient
pays for the application costs.
The exponential nitrogen runoff function is
based on Simmelsgaard (1998). The phospho-
rus runoff function is a logarithmic function,
based on Ekholm et al. (2005) and Uusitalo
and Aura (2005), including both soluble and
bioavailable particulate P. The unit damage
of nitrogen runoff (9 €/kg N runoff) is based
on an estimate by Gren and Folmer (2003)
concerning the marginal willingness-to-pay
for reduced nitrogen runoff in the Baltic Sea
region. Phosphorus unit damage is derived
from the previous studies using the Redfield
ratio of 7.2, which allows the expression of
phosphorus runoff in nitrogen equivalents
when accounting for the optimal nutrient ratio
for phytoplankton growth in the Baltic Sea
(Kiirikki et al. 2003). GHG emission calcula-
tions for dairy production and manure are
mainly based on the Finnish GHG Inventory
Report (Statistics Finland 2016). Values for
soil emissions are based on Heikkinen et al.
(2013) and emissions from cultivation mea-
sures on Ervola et al. (2018). To express differ-
ent GHGs as CO2 equivalents, we use the
common approach of global warming poten-
tial of 100 years (GWP100), instead of giving
less emphasis on non-CO2 emissions, as some
researchers have suggested, regarding them
as systemic emissions in contrast to fossil-
based CO2 emissions (Allen et al. 2016). The
climate damage value (50 €/t CO2-eq.) is cho-
sen based on Tol (2011). The marginal climate
damage from GHG emissions is constant as it
is a global emission. Although a regional efflu-
ent, marginal damage from nutrient runoff is
also considered constant. Field parcels as run-
off sources within one farm are geographically
so close together that we can assume an equal
proximity to watercourses and thus an equal
eutrophication potential. If the model was
extended to cover multiple farms, varying
damage depending on the location and trans-
port of nutrients would become relevant.
Manure spreading technologies affect nutri-
ent runoff andGHG emissions. Due to missing
information and mixed effects, each spreading
technology is assumed to have the same impact
on N runoff (Rotz 2004; Uusi-Kämppä 2010;
Uusi-Kämppä and Mattila 2010) and on direct
N2O emissions (Webb et al. 2010). The effect
on phosphorus runoff is based onUusi-Kämppä
and Heinonen-Tanski (2008). Impacts on the
amount of volatilized NH3, and thus indirect
N2O emissions, are accounted for based on
Grönroos (2014) as explained above.
In addition to the field parcels allocated to
silage or barley cultivation, the farm has a sep-
arate area for pasture (42 ha in total is
assumed). We assume a part-time grazing
period of four months and, thus, an unchanged
diet throughout the year despite pasturage.
The grazing period and stocking density used
are the average values for Finland. Part of
the manure produced is excreted on the pas-
ture (i.e. less manure for storage and spread-
ing), and the area is also fertilized with
mineral fertilizer. Cultivation costs and GHG
emissions from the pasture are assumed to be
the same as those for silage. The extra pasture
area (the maximum 42 ha minus the stocking
density multiplied by the herd size) is used to
cultivate barley with the same mineral fertili-
zation as in the private optimum. Market
prices, costs, nutrient runoff, and GHG emis-
sions for the barley are the same as above.
Simulations
We next present the results from the simula-
tions. We derive separately the optimal deci-
sions for each technology combination and
choose the one yielding the highest profit or
welfare (only the optimal solution is pre-
sented). Simulations are performed for a Finn-
ish Baltic Sea case described above. Sensitivity
analysis allows us to test the robustness of the
results while changing the values of exogenous
parameters (detailed results are shown in the
online supplementary material 2). Finally, we
study climate and water policy instruments
and discuss the role of phosphorus.
Results
Private and Social Optima: The Baseline
We collect the baseline simulation results for
private and social optima in table 2. The social
optimum is presented for three alternative
cases, where society accounts for (a) GHG
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emissions only (climate policy scenario),
(b) nutrient runoff only (water policy sce-
nario), and (c) both GHG emissions and nutri-
ent runoff (joint policy scenario). In each case,
social welfare includes both types of damage,
even if they are not accounted for in the
optimization.
Comparing private and social optima, we
first observe that herd size differs consider-
ably; the joint policy scenario has nine animals
less than the private optimum. In each case,
there is a maximum of two barley parcels out
of the ten field parcels. Allocating all parcels
to silage cultivation is optimal for the water
and joint policy scenarios. In the social optima
silage is preferred to barley as the propensity
to nutrient runoff and soil GHG emissions is
higher for cereals.
Optimal concentrate feeding is intensive. In
fact, in every case, the feeding level is higher
than the milk yield maximizing value
(15.65 kg DM/day). This is what the theory
suggested: the farmer values the increase in
manure stock to the extent that he trades off
some of his milk revenues for valuable fertil-
izer in cultivation. The result is, however,
highly dependent on relative market prices.
For example, decreased milk, barley, or min-
eral fertilizer price results in reduced concen-
trate feeding below the milk yield maximizing
level (see detailed sensitivity analysis results
in the online supplementary material 2). The
result also implies that concentrate feed use
depends on herd size compared to the amount
of farmland available, again underlining the
interdependency of the decisions regarding
milk production and land use. This is con-
firmed in the sensitivity analysis, where a
higher stocking density and increased cultiva-
tion area both result in a lower concentrate
intake level for the water and joint policy sce-
narios. Finally, note that despite the changes
in diet appearing quite small at first glance, a
1-kg change in silage feeding in the daily ration
of a single cow amounts to an annual quantity
of over 21,000 kg with the baseline herd size,
equaling a yield of approximately 5 ha.
Optimal manure storage and spreading
technologies are identical for all cases. The dif-
ference in profits or social welfare between no
cover and floating cover is quite small if the
spreading technology does not change. Fertili-
zation is based either on manure or mineral
fertilizer. Figure 1 illustrates the spatial pat-
tern of manure and mineral fertilizer applica-
tion. Optimal nitrogen application is solved
for each discrete distance (0.5, 1,…, 5 km),
and these points are combined to provide a
clear illustration. Figure 1 confirms the pattern
we derived analytically in the previous chap-
ter. The manure application rate is higher on
the parcels closest to the farm center and
decreases monotonically when moving further
away from the farm center.
Furthermore, as the critical radius marks
the point where the mineral fertilizer and
manure application rates would be equal, the
nitrogen application rate of fields receiving
manure is always higher than the nitrogen
application rate of parcels under mineral
Table 2. Optimal Simulation Results Under the Baseline
Private Climate policy Water policy Joint policy
Herd size, dairy cows 62 56 59 53
Barley parcels (out of 10 parcels) 2 2 0 0
Milk, kg/animal/year 9,213 9,213 9,215 9,214
Milk in total, kg/farm/year 571,206 515,928 543,685 488,342
Milking seasons 3 3 3 3
Concentrates, kg DM/animal/day 16.09 16.12 15.70 15.91
Silage, kg DM/animal/day 5.91 5.89 6.21 6.05
Manure in storage, m3/animal/year 24.56 24.56 24.51 24.53
Manure in total, m3/farm/year 1,531 1,376 1,457 1,291
Manure exported, m3/year 0 0 0 0
Manure storage cover (no/floating) floating floating floating floating
Manure spreading (broadcast/injection) broadcast broadcast broadcast broadcast
Total nutrient runoff, kg N-eq./year 3,352 3,150 2,947 2,784
Total GHG emissions, kg CO2-eq./year 502,374 463,997 459,641 418,994
Private profits, €/farm/year 87,019 86,050 85,456 82,974
Runoff damages, €/farm/year 30,166 28,346 26,520 25,058
Climate damages, €/farm/year 25,119 23,200 22,982 20,950
Social welfare, €/farm/year 31,735 34,504 35,954 36,966
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fertilization. Note that the notch in fertiliza-
tion pattern marks the outer range of silage
production in the private optimum, whereas
barley requires less fertilization. Comparing
the socially optimal fertilization patterns, we
observe that when moving from accounting
for only one type of damage to both damages,
the overall fertilization level decreases.
Turning next to environmental impacts, the
socially optimal solutions feature 8–17% smal-
ler climate damages and 6–17% smaller runoff
damages relative to the private optimum;
these damages are the smallest when both
externalities are accounted for. The water pol-
icy scenario leads to lower GHG emissions
than the climate policy scenario. This is
explained by two factors. First, under nutrient
policies, the farmer has a larger set of manage-
ment options available: it now pays to reduce
fertilizer application and allocate land for
silage (and less for cereal crops). A higher
silage area and lower use of mineral fertilizer
both contribute to a reduction in GHG emis-
sions. For the climate policy scenario, fine-
tuning manure management and diet impact
GHG emissions only negligibly. Additionally,
soil emissions are rather independent of man-
agement decisions. Second, the size of the
marginal climate damage versus water dam-
agematters.We also studied the effect of vary-
ing climate and water damage on the results
(see the online supplementary material 2).
Lowering water damage (to 7.2 €/kgNe) or
increasing climate damage (to 65 €/tCO2e)
affects such that water policies alone do not
decrease GHG emissions more than climate
policies alone. This finding is discussed more
in the concluding remarks.
To shed further light on the difficulty of
reducing GHG emissions, we provide table 3,
which highlights how the key sources of
GHG emissions differ in the four cases of
table 2. Clearly, the greatest reduction possi-
bility when only climate damage counts is
found by reducing the number of animals. This
action eliminates a total of 32,096 kg CO2e
emissions from enteric fermentation, manure
storage and pasture, whereas other measures
eliminate only 6,280 kg CO2e, more than five
times less. When only nutrient loading counts,
the reduction from enteric fermentation,
manure storage and pasture is 13,480 kg
CO2e, and from other measures, the reduction
is 29,253 kg CO2e. Here, changes in land allo-
cation and fertilization play amuch larger role.
In summary, our baseline results reproduce
the key insights from the theoretical analysis:
the private farmer uses too much the polluting
inputs (herd size, diet, land allocation, fertil-
izer) and therefore causes too much pollution
relative to the social optimum.
The baseline results imply that reducing herd
size is an effective albeit expensive means to
reduce GHG emissions. Thus, we next look at
how nutrient runoff and GHG emissions would
change if the farmer switches the production
line from mixed dairy-crop production to pure
crop production (no milk production, manure,
or pasture land). To keep the analysis simple,
we assume that revenue from selling the ani-
mals out covers the adjustment costs to crop
production. The results are illustrated in table 4.
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Figure 1. Spatial nitrogen application from manure and mineral fertilizer in the baseline
scenario: private optimum and the climate, water and joint policy scenarios
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Comparing the results in table 4 with the
baseline results in table 2, we observe that
both climate and runoff damages are reduced
considerably. However, social welfare is
reduced as well, being negative in all cases.
Nitrogen fertilization is equal in all field plots,
as transportation costs for mineral fertilizer
are assumed insignificant, and manure is not
available. Changing from dairy to crop pro-
duction would thus provide environmental
benefits but with a high cost.
Examination of Climate and Water Policy
Instruments
We first study the impacts of optimal carbon
and nutrient taxes outlined in equations (13a),
(13b) and (13c) to induce the social optimum
when both damages are accounted for. For a
case where either runoff or climate damage is
accounted for, only one of the two taxes is used.
Table 5 shows the differentiated nutrient tax
rates. The optimal carbon tax is set to 0.05 €/kg
CO2-eq. in every case reflecting the literature
on future carbon valuation. The nutrient tax
in the absence and presence of climate policies
shows interesting features. Recall, the water
and joint policy scenarios entailed allocating
all land to silage and a differentiated nutrient
tax on fertilization. Consequently, nutrient
taxes are higher for cereals than for silage,
phasing out cereal cultivation. The nutrient
tax for applying mineral fertilizer to cereals
would almost double the fertilizer market
price. The nutrient tax on mineral fertilizer
for silage is approximately half that for cereals.
In all cases, the tax rates are decreasing in dis-
tance. When climate impacts are included, the
nutrient tax rate on manure is lower, and on
mineral fertilizer, the tax rate is higher due to
higher CO2-eq. emissions. Thus, we find that
nutrient and carbon taxes asymmetrically
affect manure and mineral fertilizer. Manure
causes relatively more runoff and mineral fer-
tilizers relatively more GHG emissions, and
thus, a nutrient tax affects manure more and
a climate tax affects mineral fertilizers more.
In summary, we find that taxes generally
reduce the overall level of fertilization and
increase the critical radius for manure applica-
tion, moving the private optimum closer to the
social optimum.
We also varied the climate and water dam-
age values when deriving the tax rates. Cur-
rently, the generally used climate damage
Table 3. Total GHG Emissions Separated by Source from Privately and Socially Optimal
Production in the Baseline Scenario
Private
Climate
policy
Water
policy
Joint
policy Unit
Enteric fermentation (CH4) 321,466 288,850 307,400 271,830 kg CO2-eq./year
Manure storage (CH4) 56,041 50,341 53,772 47,461 kg CO2-eq./year
Manure storage (N2O) 1,052 945 1,002 888 kg CO2-eq./year
Manure management (indirect N2O) 517 465 494 437 kg CO2-eq./year
Soil (autonomous) 38,868 38,868 25,560 25,560 kg CO2-eq./year
Mineral fertilizer 26,183 20,510 14,527 9,757 kg CO2-eq./year
Cultivation practices 17,771 17,164 13,482 12,788 kg CO2-eq./year
Pasture (incl. all sources) 40,477 46,856 43,405 50,274 kg CO2-eq./year
TOTAL 502,374 463,997 459,641 418,994 kg CO2-eq./year
Table 4. Optimal Simulation Results with Only Barley Cultivation (No Dairy Production)
Private Climate policy Water policy Joint policy
Barley parcels (out of 10 parcels) 10 10 10 10
Fertilization, kg N/ha 102 94 66 59
Fertilization, kg P/ha 17 16 11 10
Total nutrient runoff, kg N-eq./year 2,054 1,984 1,756 1,706
Total GHG emissions, kg CO2-eq./year 147,899 145,615 137,175 135,029
Private profits, €/farm/year 16,648 16,590 15,440 14,928
Runoff damage, €/farm/year 18,484 17,853 15,808 15,351
Climate damage, €/farm/year 7,395 7,281 6,859 6,751
Social welfare, €/farm/year −9,232 −8,544 −7,227 −7,174
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value ranges around 35 and 50 €/kgCO2-eq.
(Rogelj et al. 2015; OECD 2016), and the
water damage value around 9 and 10.8 €/kgNe
(Gren and Folmer 2003). For these values,
using a nutrient tax only reduces nutrient run-
off more than using a carbon tax only. The
reduction in GHG emissions varies depending
on the relative climate and water damage.
Detailed results can be found in table A26 in
the online supplementary material 2.
We noted in the theoretical discussion that
differentiated instruments are difficult to
implement without high transaction costs;
thus, second-best instruments, such as a uni-
form nutrient tax and a carbon tax based on
animal numbers, provide potential alterna-
tives. As a uniform tax rate, we used the aver-
age rates for manure and mineral fertilizers
from table 5. With these average rates, fertili-
zation in the private optimum with nutrient
tax only and with both taxes follows quite
closely the social optimum. The private solu-
tions result in somewhat higher nutrient runoff
and GHG emissions than the social optima.
Social welfare loss with uniform nutrient taxes
compared to the social optimum is between
200 and 1,000 €/farm/year. Additionally, uni-
form taxes are much easier to implement, but
they do not create the same incentives for land
allocation changes as spatially differentiated
taxes. Uniform taxes in our analysis can be
compared with the uniform pollution tax of a
whole-farm policy described in Schnitkey and
Miranda (1993).
The tax on animals is conveniently based on
the average methane emissions from enteric
fermentation. The effects of an animal-based
tax are comparable to those of increasing the
general dairy cost (reduced herd size, more
land allocated to barley). In the private opti-
mum, the per-animal methane emissions are
5,185 kgCO2e, yielding a damage of 259 €/ani-
mal. With this as a per-animal tax rate, the pri-
vate solution moves clearly closer to the
outcome of the climate policy scenario: herd
size is almost the same, onemore parcel is allo-
cated to barley, and both runoff and GHG
emissions remain slightly above socially opti-
mal levels (see table A27 and figure A25 in
the online supplementary material 2 for
detailed results). This is natural, as the per-
animal tax does not account for emissions
stemming from croplands or related activities.
Hence, we conclude that simpler and still
effective policies can be based on uniform
taxes levied on nutrients and animals.
In all of our cases, manure produced on the
farm is spread onto fields of the same farm as
the postulated amount of arable land is high.
To examine the role of manure export from
the farm and subsidies promoting this practice,
we considerably reduce the land available for
the private farmer while keeping herd size at
the privately optimal level. In the absence of
policies, reducing the land area implies that
the farmer first increases use of manure on all
fields but starts to export manure when the
overall land area is evenly decreased up to
8 ha. Assuming that the receiving farm does
not pay anything for the manure, exports
increase when land area further decreases
(with a total of 7 ha the farmer would export
Table 5. Spatially Differentiated and Uniform Nutrient Tax Rates (€/kg N)
Parcel distance
to farm center
Nutrient tax only Both nutrient and carbon taxes
Silage Cereal Silage Cereal
m l m l m l m l
0.5 0.76 - 2.00 - 0.71 - 1.82 -
1 0.67 - 1.77 - 0.63 - 1.61 -
1.5 0.59 - 1.55 - 0.56 - 1.41 -
2 0.52 - 1.35 - 0.49 - 1.23 -
2.5 - 0.48 - 1.28 - 0.66 - 1.38
3 - 0.47 - 1.25 - 0.65 - 1.35
3.5 - 0.46 - 1.21 - 0.64 - 1.32
4 - 0.44 - 1.18 - 0.63 - 1.28
4.5 - 0.43 - 1.15 - 0.62 - 1.25
5 - 0.42 - 1.11 - 0.61 - 1.22
Uniform taxes* Manure 0.83 Mineral 0.62 Manure 0.56 Mineral 0.98
Note: m denotes manure, and l denotes mineral fertilizer. The carbon tax rate is set to 0.05 €/kg CO2-eq. when solving for optimal nutrient taxes with both taxes in
place.
*Uniform tax rates are average values of the differentiated tax rates and are calculated separately for manure and mineral fertilizers.
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13% of the manure). Under the original
amount of arable land and original herd size,
the farmer starts to export manure provided a
subsidy is provided at a rate of 0.8 €/m3. In the
model, exportingmanure up to a 6-km distance
costs approximately 4.7 €/m3, meaning that the
actual support should be almost 5.5 €/m3. Cor-
ner solutions take place with minor changes in
the subsidy rate: at a rate of 1.8 €/m3, allmanure
is exported, and the dairy farmer shifts to min-
eral fertilization (see table A25 and figure
A24 in the online supplementary material 2).
With the 1.8 €/m3 subsidy rate, the actual sup-
port needed would be 6.5 €/m3, yielding a total
subsidy of 9,900 €/farm/year with 1,523 m3
manure exported. The subsidy outlays are large
making them fiscally challenging, which sug-
gests that other measures (such as buffer strips)
could be preferable. Furthermore, that all
manure would be exported is naturally unreal-
istic and results from the fact that we assumed
that crop production farmers within all dis-
tances accept manure on their fields. Under
the export subsidy, both GHG emissions and
nutrient runoff remained quite close to the pri-
vately optimal levels.
The Role of Phosphorus
Our analysis focuses on nitrogen. We now link
our analysis drawing on optimal nitrogen fertil-
ization to phosphorus. First, how does phospho-
rus fertilization look like in the case where
optimal fertilization is based on nitrogen only,
but phosphorus is accounted for in nutrient run-
off as nitrogen equivalents? Figure 2 confirms
the same application pattern for phosphorus as
that shown for nitrogen in figure 1. However,
as manure has more phosphorus relative to
nitrogen compared to mineral fertilizers, the
closest field parcels clearly receive excessive
amounts of phosphorus. This has also been wit-
nessed in practice and is the main cause of high
phosphorus loads. An important issue to note is
that the same application pattern at lower inten-
sity can be found for the social optima as well.
This suggests that unlike in crop production
farms, uniform phosphorus fertilization is not
socially optimal for dairy farms.
We next determine the soil total phosphorus
(STP) assuming constant privately optimal
nitrogen fertilization over 30 years. At the
beginning of the period, we set the STP to a
baseline value of 10.6 mg/l. Depending on
the distance of the field, STP evolves to a
range of 8.3—22.8 mg/l (see figure 3; STP cal-
culated based on Saarela et al. 1995; Iho and
Laukkanen 2018; Uusitalo et al. 2016; Sihvo-
nen et al. 2018). Thus, the change in the STP
over a dairy management planning horizon is
quite modest.
We finally want to compare how a phospho-
rus policy impacts private farmers’ choices
when there is an upper limit on phosphorus
fertilizer applications per hectare. We restrict
phosphorus fertilization to 20 kg/ha and
assume that the farmer compensates for the
reduction in manure nitrogen by an additional
nitrate fertilization. As manure application
becomes constant and lower than the private
optimum (except for the parcel where the
manure runs out), manure is spread further
compared to the baseline (see figure A23 and
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Figure 2. Spatial phosphorus application from manure and mineral fertilizer in the baseline
scenario: private optimum and the climate, water and joint policy scenarios
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table A24 in the online supplementary mate-
rial 2, and figure 3 for STP levels resulting
from the phosphorus policy). Due to the phos-
phorus policy, herd size decreases slightly
compared to the private baseline, as do
animal-based GHG emissions. In total, GHG
emissions slightly decrease relative to the pri-
vate optimum without a phosphorus limit but
remain higher than any of the social optima.
Thus, phosphorus policy does not target cli-
mate emissions as efficiently as nitrogen pol-
icy. Also nutrient runoff decreases as the
total amount of nutrients applied to fields is
lower. As a result, private profits are
decreased relative to the baseline, but they
are higher than under tax policy, as phospho-
rus policy does not cause direct tax payments
from the farmer. In line with Iho, Parker, and
Zilberman (2012), herd size is lower with a
phosphorus-based policy relative to the pri-
vate optimum, and the radius of manure appli-
cation increases as not all land was utilized for
manure applications at the baseline.
Concluding Remarks
We examined the outcomes of privately opti-
mal and socially optimal dairy production in
the presence of nutrient runoff and GHG
emissions. The dairy farmer was assumed to
maximize revenue from milk production by
choosing the herd size and its diet, fertilizer
application, land allocation between crops,
number of milking seasons, and manure stor-
age and spreading technologies. Diet choice
lies at the heart of the model. We demon-
strated that on a dairy farm, land-use decisions
and animal management decisions are inti-
mately linked to one another via decisions
related to feeding and manure application.
One interesting implication of this linkage is
that land allocation decisions also affect con-
centrate feed use. In simulation results, land
allocation decisions increased concentrate
feed use beyond the milk yield maximizing
value in certain scenarios.
The privately optimal nitrogen and phos-
phorus fertilization rates are always higher
when manure is used as a fertilizer input, as
in Schnitkey and Miranda (1993) and Innes
(2000). This finding also holds true for the
social optimum. Both private and social
optima feature a monotonically decreasing
manure application pattern, resulting in high
application rates on the closest parcels.
Although this is a new result, it is intuitive, as
manure is a free byproduct and transportation
costs equally affect both private profits and
social welfare. This pattern is independent of
whether runoff damage only or climate dam-
age only is taken into account, but private
and socially optimal fertilization patterns dif-
fer in that privately optimal fertilization rates
are higher for both fertilizer inputs. Further-
more, the socially optimal critical radius of
manure application is larger than the private
range, and the manure is more evenly distrib-
uted on field parcels. The price of mineral fer-
tilizer is the most obvious driver of changes in
the critical radius, as also found by Schnitkey
and Miranda (1993). We also demonstrated
that, through the shadow price of manure, all
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Figure 3. Soil total phosphorus after 30 years of privately optimal nitrogen fertilization in the
baseline scenario and with a phosphorus limit
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exogenous variables (in addition to the profit
contribution of livestock, crop andmineral fer-
tilizer prices and hauling costs described in
Schnitkey and Miranda) impact the critical
manure application radius, including changes
in the allocation of farmland between different
crops.
The policy implications of these results are
important: optimal policy does not require
constant manure application across parcels
but spatially differentiated application rates.
Thus, N fertilization limits, drawing on the
socially optimal mineral fertilizer application
in crop production farms, are not optimal for
dairy farms. To put it simply, policies toward
crop production farms using mineral fertilizers
and dairy farms using manure should differ.
However, using differentiated instruments
for dairy farms is difficult. The second-best
uniform policies, such as a uniform nutrient
tax, animal tax, or manure export subsidy,
affect the critical radius for manure applica-
tion. Expanding the critical radius decreases
fertilization in all locations because manure is
spread on a larger area, decreasing the amount
applied to any one point (as discussed by
e.g. Innes 2000; Iho, Parker, and Zilberman
2012). A uniform nutrient tax causes some
welfare loss compared to the social optimum
and lacks incentives for changes in land alloca-
tion, but it minimizes transaction costs. This
finding is in line with Schnitkey and Miranda
(1993), who concluded that a spatially uniform
tax for phosphorus is optimal as a whole-farm
policy and that a pointwise policy calls for a
spatially differentiated tax. These researchers
note that as the uniform tax allows for higher
manure applications, it also supports greater
animal numbers and reduces costs compared
to a spatially differentiated tax. Innes (2000)
also showed that a tax on mineral fertilizer
increases the radius for manure application.
We developed a numerical model rooted in
Finnish agriculture, environmental studies on
nutrient loading and IPCC guidelines for
GHG emission calculations. The model facili-
tates numerical assessment of differences
between private and social solutions, and scru-
tinizes the relative impacts of nutrient and cli-
mate damage. In general, the simulations
reproduced all key patterns of the analytical
model, such as the spatial pattern of manure
and mineral fertilization, the critical radii of
manure application and silage cultivation,
and the differences in private and social
choices over these features. In general, the pri-
vate optimum entails excessive herd size,
concentrate feed intake, and fertilizer applica-
tion for both manure and mineral fertilizer,
with a shift from manure to mineral fertilizers
too close to the farm center, and excessive land
allocated to cereals, thus resulting in excessive
nutrient runoff and GHG emissions relative to
the socially optimal choices.
The sensitivity analysis shows that the
results are robust relative to economic vari-
ables. Whether climate or water policies
reduce GHG emissions or nutrient runoff
more efficiently depends on the relative values
of water and climate damage. In any case,
accounting for one pollutant only reduces the
load of the other pollutant as well. This is in
line with Schils et al. (2006, 2007) concluding
that policies targeting reductions in nitrogen
loading also reduced GHG emissions. Based
on our results, nutrient policy supports a larger
number of dairy cows than climate policy, as
herd size is the main source of GHG
emissions.
The most interesting outcome relates to the
dairy farm’s possibilities of adjusting to cli-
mate and water policies. In general, we dem-
onstrated that dairy farming, when managed
in a socially optimal fashion, has multiple
options for reducing nutrient loading without
reducing revenue from milk production.
These mostly include actions related to culti-
vation, such as lower fertilization, shifting land
to silage production and using injection tech-
nology for manure management. However,
these are also complemented by a smaller herd
size compared to the private optimum.
Options to reduce GHG emissions are much
more limited because manure management
contributes only slightly to lower GHG emis-
sions and because autonomous soil emission
cannot be impacted except by changing land
allocation towards silage. Herd size is there-
fore much smaller in the case where both dam-
ages are accounted for than under private
optimum or in the case where only nutrient
damage is accounted for.
The studied taxes impact manure and min-
eral fertilizers asymmetrically. The nutrient
tax affects manure more than mineral fertil-
izers and adding a carbon tax affects mineral
fertilizers more severely. The tax bases for
nutrient and carbon taxes differ considerably
and so do the possible measures that farmers
may adopt to affect the emissions. The tax
base for the carbon tax is broad, but there is
only one truly effective measure to reduce
GHG emissions (reducing herd size). For the
nutrient tax, the tax base is muchmore limited,
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but possibilities to affect nutrient runoff are
numerous.
Spatially differentiated nutrient taxes
increase the cost of both manure and mineral
fertilizer applications. This increase is relatively
higher closer to the farm center. This reduces
the overall level of fertilization and increases
the critical radius for manure application closer
to the social optimum. Taxes are higher for
cereals than for silage, shifting the private land
allocation toward the socially optimal one.Uni-
form nutrient taxes also increase fertilization
costs in general, thus lowering privately optimal
fertilization levels, and we find that uniform
taxes work quite well for dairy farming.
We also examined the role of a manure
export subsidy as a second-best instrument.
From the manure-producer point of view,
manure exports become profitable as the total
subsidy (also covering all hauling costs)
exceeds 5.5 €/m3. This is naturally dependent
on export distances. Whether all costs should
be covered also depends on the crop farmers’
willingness to accept manure in their fields.
Here, local circumstances differ. In a survey
conducted in Nebraska, approximately half
of the respondents gave manure away at no
charge, whereas the other half charged based
on either unit volume, weight or load, hauling
distance, or nutrient content (Glewen and
Koelsch 2001). From the receiver point of
view, if exported manure is received by a crop
farm, then analytically, the crop farmer would
be willing to pay a price comprising the min-
eral fertilizer application costs divided by the
amount of manure needed to meet the crop
needs (Iho, Parker, and Zilberman 2012).
Our analysis has omitted possible measures,
such as buffer strips or catch crops, to further
reduce nutrient runoff. These would not
change the results much, because in the social
optimum, all land is allocated to silage, pro-
duction of which creates a lower runoff pro-
pensity than that of cereals. Measures for
reducing GHG emissions are scarce. Buffer
strips would slightly sequester the carbon in
soil, thereby reducing net emissions. However,
herd size remains the key short-term measure
for reducing emissions. Thus, focus must be
placed on mid-term solutions, such as higher
milk productivity per cow, and technological
diet-based solutions to reduce methane emis-
sions from animals. Additionally, producing
biogas from manure and silage would help
replace fossil fuels.
How much would a shift from dairy produc-
tion to crop production help climate wise?
Clearly, both climate emissions and nutrient
loading would decrease considerably but so
would social welfare. A switch between dairy
and crop production is naturally a complex
issue, as noted by Garnett (2009), who pro-
vides a broad discussion on various aspects,
such as need, indirect effects, and opportunity
costs, considering the reduction in livestock-
related production and consumption. Dairy
farming is expected to intensify over time,
leading to larger farms (Lehtonen et al.
2001). This creates new challenges for environ-
mental sustainability and increases pressure to
export manure. However, it concurrently also
creates opportunities for innovative techno-
logical solutions and improved productivity.
The future research issues facing dairy farming
are numerous and interesting.
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